Blond, blue eyed and human Rights
by Murad Hoffman
Why should we accept declarations of human rights drafted by the same
powers that colonized and pillaged our countries? --- Shirin Sinnari
Where there is smoke, there is fire, the saying goes. This folk wisdom
forces Muslims to prove a negative: they have to disprove three major
accusations leveled at them by the West, i.e., that (1) Islam has
prevented them from respecting human rights, (2) especially the basic
rights of women, and that (3) Muslims have yet to show that they, are
capable of democracy. In essence, these are questions of morality, not
theology, but sooner or later they become the focus of every
Islamic?Christian dialogue.
This is quite obvious as far as the West is concerned. However, a
productive discussion of these three topics is a prerequisite ?
conditio sine qua non ? for any normalization of relationship with
Islam. What happens in these three fields is of even greater importance
for the Muslim side since the global future of Islam itself may hinge
on it. On the other hand, as Neil Hicks sees it, it is also quite
evident that certain forces in the West have a vested interest in
perpetuating the myth of Islam's incompatibility with human rights and
democracy.2 It is never easy to prove a negative; however, this chapter
sets out to demonstrate that Muslims are indeed not incapable of
protecting human rights, for human rights are a distinctively an
integral, Islamic issue.
WHEN discussing human rights, Muslims often discover to their surprise
and dismay that their Western interlocutors believe to have both
invented and patented the subject. People in the Occident really expect
that human rights are respected only in the West, as a matter of
principle, and generally disrespected, again as a matter of principle,
all over the Muslim world.
The first conviction is quite understandable, because it was indeed the
Occident ? notably England ? where a specific human rights codex
emerged that was designed to protect the individual citizen from State
abuse, essentially as defensive freedom from something. Back then, in
the 17th and 18th centuries, it had not yet occurred to anybody to
demand from the monarchs the very civic entitlements which have become
so important today, the active freedom of something.
Important landmarks in the Western history of human rights were the
British Magna Charta Libertatum (1215), the Act of Habeas Corpus
(1679), the Bill of Rights (1689), the American Declaration of
Independence of 1776 (making reference to God), and the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 (less explicit
about God). The famous, but not binding, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948, was exclusively based on
these Western precedents. It was not much different from the two
(binding) International Pacts on Civic, Political, Social, Economic,
and Cultural Rights of December 19, 1966 and also from the human rights
instruments of the European Council.
And yet these developments became possible not due to Christianity, but
in spite of it. Up until Pope John XXIII in the past century, the
concept of human rights was condemned as secularist, laicistic, and
naturalist. Only with his Encyclical Pacem in Terris of April 11, 1963,
were human rights finally admitted into the Vatican.
This history does not imply that Islam did not possess any legal
concepts comparable to human rights, notably based on the Qur'an. The
Western pride of invention and ownership of human rights, is an
assertion which simply ignores the fact that, throughout history, the
states have always and everywhere disregarded the rights of ordinary
people, also in the Christian Occident. Even today, the state of human
rights is deplorable worldwide, also in ? but not limited to ? Muslim
countries; Amnesty International maintains depressing files.
Fairness requires non?Muslims to admit that violations of human rights
in nominally Islamic states, such as torture, police brutality,
election fraud, censorship, and infringements on religious freedom are
neither motivated by Islam nor legitimized by it. The fact that jails
in the Muslim world are primarily populated by Muslim activists of
strong religious convictions proves the contrary. One should accept
once and for all that a country like Turkey, with a Muslim population,
is not necessarily an Islamic state, just as a country like Spain,
populated by Christians, must not necessarily be called a Christian
state.
Western human rights experts cannot be spared answering the following
question repeatedly asked in this book: have there ever been worse
violations of human rights, in quantity as well as quality, than during
the two World Wars, with the use of chemical and nuclear weapons;
during the Stalinist terror regime and the Holocaust; under apartheid
in South Africa and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo? Muslims
committed none of these atrocities. The noted Kenyan social
anthropologist, professor, Ali Mazrui at Binghamton University, in the
State of New York says: "If Islam in the twentieth century has not
always been the most fertile ground for democracy, it has also been
less fertile ground for the greatest evils of this century: Nazism,
fascism, communism, and genocide .... Muslims are often criticized for
not producing the best, but they are not congratulated for having
standards of human behavior that avert the worst. There are no Muslim
equivalents of Nazi concentration camps, American racial lynching,
apartheid under the Dutch Reformed Church, Japanese racism before the
Second World War, or genocide under Stalin and Pol pot. '13
Even so, Western interlocutors still claim the moral high ground,
demanding the worldwide implementation of a Euro?American value system
of individual human rights under penalty of canceling their
developmental aid. Given the two widely differing yardsticks with which
Western people judge themselves and others, they should not be
surprised when young Muslims cynically observe that human rights
probably are "blond and blue?eyed."
Human rights, whether blond and blue?eyed or not, can be wielded like a
club. Therefore, Parvez Manzoor was correct when stating, in 1994, that
"Human Rights talk is power talk. 114 This is the reason why there are
still voices heard ? although they are fading out ? who talk about
Islam or human rights, as if they were opposites. They consider human
rights a "holy cow of modernity ... which should not be blindly
worshipped, but subjected to critical scrutiny ... especially since the
the Shari'ah offers solutions to every issue, independent of time and
place. "5
But no use complaining, Muslims have to take a stand. Most Muslims
states belong to the group of Third World countries euphemistically
called "developing countries", even those basking in a warm petrodollar
rain. These Third World countries, inclusive of Muslim ones,
traditionally defended their human rights record by pointing towards
the interdependence of civil rights on the one hand, and social,
economic and cultural rights on the other hand. They convincingly
argued that elections amount to little more than the confirmation of
tribal chiefs as long as voters remain illiterate. It may not fit into
the political pigeonhole of Third World ideologues but, according to
Panajotis Kondylis, it is self?evident that "human rights, which
promise each individual autonomy and dignity equally, can only thrive
in societies where a highly differentiated division of labor atomizes
the collective, and where mass production and consumption are running
in high gear. "6 It is equally undeniable that democracy needs a civil
society which, in turn, is . only possible when structural poverty is
overcome.
By using such arguments, Third World countries have managed to slip in
a catalog of their own particular human rights, such as the right to
education, work and livelihood, into some of the more recent human
rights treaties.
The same countries think they can ward off the human rights by
questioning their universal validity. (This is their second line of
defense.) In effect, they characterized the existing human rights
statutes as Euroand ethnocentric, and therefore as alien to other
cultures, such as those of Asia or Sub?Saharan Africa. Behind the
theory of universality they even detected Francis Fukuyama's flawed
assumption that history had come to an end by endorsing the Western
model of civilization, once and for all.7
This view of human rights may be correct as far as inflamatory and
stylish legal innovations are concerned, such as the "right to be
afraid" (of all things nuclear), the "right to intoxication" (by means
of legalized drugs), or the "right to homosexual marriage." The
assumption of a cultural limitation of human rights is, however, not
correct in respect to the classical core rights, such the right to
life, and freedom from torture, freedom of opinion, conscience,
_expression and religion, and the personal liberties (freedom of
movement, assembly, association, etc.).
Muslims damage their own cause whenever they get carried away towards
questioning any of these core human rights. In particular, they should
not exploit for their own purposes Samuel Huntington's pessimistic
assessment that worldwide unanimity on human rights exists in but one
point: the total reprehensibility of torture.'
A far better strategy would be to deal with the human rights phenomenon
in the framework of Islamic jurisprudence, i.e., on the basis of the
Qur'an and the sunnah. Of course, the term "human rights" was not
developed by Judaism, Christianity, or Islam. Indeed, if this modern
term were found in any holy scripture, it would be a glaring
anachronism betraying forgery. The absence of the term "human rights"
in religious discourse is due as well to the following: the very idea
that a created being could be possessor of rights evidently goes
against the grain of people ? Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike ? for
whom God, the Creator, is the sole source of rights. Divine rights for
individuals: yes. Rights of the individual: no. It was, after all, only
logical that the formulation of the concept of "human rights" had to
await a historical period, i.e., the 18th century Enlightenment, during
which man was proclaimed to be the autonomous measure of all things.
For people with transcendental links this was, and continues to be, a
downright blasphemous piece of irreligious fiction.
Muslim jurists have been particularly handicapped: given that the
entire Shari'ah is divine law, attempts to give particular norms, such
as human rights, higher rank or greater importance cannot be justified.
Muslim jurisprudence, to this day, has therefore resisted a
prioritization of norms. Muslims consistently refuse to establish a
normative hierarchy by distinguishing, according to human fancy,
between divine rights of a higher and lower order. Non?religious legal
systems like Roman Law, Civil and Common Law, French and German law,
deal with such a normative hierarchy, starting at the top with (a)
international law, and cascading down via (b) constitutional law, (c)
statutory law, to (d) decrees (d) government regulations, and (e)
administrative directives. Muslim jurists cannot, and do not, follow
suit. They continue to accord equal rank to all the norms set by the
Shari'ah, from the rules for ritual ablution to the prohibition of
earning interest. Thus there is no conceptual room for a particular set
of superior "human rights".
Although the term "human rights" is thus both absent and theologically
flawed, a positive Islamic approach to the human rights phenomenon
would yet have been possible. The fact that this opportunity was missed
opened Islam up to the nasty suspicion that it was hostile to human
rights and failing to take the protection of individuals from despotism
seriously enough. In fact, just a little ingenuity would have gone a
long way towards showing that Islam, from the very beginning 1400 years
ago, has not only known but substantially protected the core human
rights, and that Islam has anchored these rights more solidly in its
divine prime sources, the Qur'an and the sunnah, than the Occident
could with any number of man?made treaties.
The evidence is right there: take the statutory prohibition of murder
in Surah an?Nisa (4: 92) and Allah's equating the murderer of a single
person with someone killing the entire human race in Surah al?Ma'ida
(5: 32). While not specifically spelling it out, both passages
indirectly ?as a legal reflex ? permit one to discover in the Qur' an a
God?given right to life, enjoyed by all human beings. Take Surah
ash?Shura (42: 38) with Allah's commands the Muslims to settle their
affairs through mutual consultation. This obligation, phrased as a
duty, can be taken indirectly as implying the right to political
participation. The fact that the first three caliphs were elected into
office without being blood?relatives of Muhammad is sufficient evidence
to prove that an Islamic state could be a republic and need not be a
monarchy. Along these lines it can be shown that the protection of
individuals against abuse is an original Islamic concern. Should it not
then, also be possible to reinterpret the offensive terminology of
human rights as being consistent with the Qur'anic rights of man?
It should be evident that rights laid down by God are more securely
rooted than rights merely granted by treaties and hence subject to
negotiations and social change. In the West ? whether in the former
Soviet Union or in the United States ? the beautiful catalogues and
bills of human rights oftentimes were hardly worth their paper in
actual practice. Do not ask the Klu?Klux?Klan, ask African?Americans
and North American Indians.
It cannot be denied that mankind never succeeded in finding a
universally acceptable system of "natural rights", either from
observing nature or by sheer force of reasoning.9 This may be one of
the reasons why former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt (Hamburg) and
former professor of Catholic theology Hans Kung (Tiibingen) are working
towards a United Nations declaration on human obligations. Obviously,
human rights are insufficiently secured without correspondding duties
and need further buttressing by more and more paper! When will people
realize that human rights cannot stand the test of time unless solidly
founded on divine revelation?
In the wake of the above mentioned, somewhat self?righteous Occidental
human rights offensive, the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC), the most important Muslim intergovernmental organization,
finally got its act together. On August 5, 1990, as regional
sub?organization of the United Nations, it issued the "Cairo
Declaration of Human Rights in Islam", a document not legally binding,
but of political significance only." Of even lesser legal weight had
been the proceeding "Declaration of Human Rights" issued on September
19, 1981, by an "Islamic Council of Europe", a rather obscure outfit of
dubious legitimacy.
Important Islamic personalities and scholars have also entered the
human rights debate, among them individuals as influential as Muhammad
Hamidullah, Abul 'Ala Mawdudi and Prince Hassan of Jordan. During a
round table conference for the purpose of "Promoting the Universality
of Human Rights", which he had convened in `Amman from December 10 ?
13, 1994, Prince Hassan said, "Regarding human rights, we absolutely
need a global consensus ( . . . . ). The Universal Declaration on Human
Rights circumscribes the minimum standards of human life. I believe
that my faith, Islam, pursues the same goal. Each of the 30 articles of
the Declaration corresponds to a passage in Qur'an, Hadith, and sunnah
of the Prophet." The first conclusion drawn at the conference was:
"Human rights dwell in all human beings.""
THE foregoing observations will make it easier to delineate those few
differences which appear to distinguish the catalog of Islamic human
rights from the Western ones. At issue are (a) apostasy, (b) slavery,
(c) law of asylum, (d) the status of women, and (e) corporal
punishment. If current efforts (ijtihad) towards a better understanding
of the relevant Islamic sources, wholeheartedly supported by me, are
successful, the positions of both sides will become far closer than
they now appear to be. Required was, and is, a contemporary exegesis of
Islamic sources by major scholars like Muhammad Asad (1900?1992),
Rashid alGhannoushi, Hassan and Mather Hathout, Alija Izetbegovich,
Jeffrey Lang, Fathi Osman, Yusuf al?Qaradawi, Fazlur Rahman
(1919?1988), Mohamed Talbi and Hassan al?Turabi.
Concerning apostasy, any conflict with international law disappears
once the Muslim side recognizes that neither the Qur'an nor the sunnah
specify any punishment in this world (fl?d?dunya) for merely breaking
with Islam.12 The Qur'an describes no less than 13 cases of apostasy;
invariably severe consequences are announced, but only for the
afterlife. Earlier, the universally valid maxim "no compulsion in
matters of religion!" (la ikraha fi?d?din; 2:256) had been interpreted
as applying only to the relationship between Muslims and non?Muslims.
In this day and age, however, all Muslims should admit that this
fundamental rule of religious tolerance must form the relationship
among Muslims as well. Should they not be at least as tolerant among
each other as they are bound to be toward outsiders? Those who deny the
universal application of the Qur'an verse 2: 256, among them many an
overzealous Muslim, forget that "no compulsion in matters of religion!"
also restates that, given the crucial importance of intention (niya),
coercion in matters of personal conviction means attempting the
impossible. Muslim states can enforce proper behavior except when its
validity requires personal assent. Pummeling the faithful into praying
and fasting should become a thing of the past.
Originally, apostate ex?Muslims were only prosecuted, and rightly so,
if in addition they also committed high treason (ar?ridda), i.e., if
they actively fought against the Muslim community in the sense of Surah
alMa'ida (5): 33. High treason includes hurting the cause of Islam by
withholding legitimate taxes, espionage, sabotage, counter?propaganda,
and any other way of "causing mischief on earth".
It remains true, however, that apostates under an Islamic community are
discriminated against in matters of inheritance, because according to
the sunnah, Muslims and non?Muslims cannot inherit from each other.l3
Here, being a member of the Islamic community is equated to modern
citizenship, and international civil law, as a matter of principle,
sees nothing wrong in tying inheritance to citizenship.
The problem of slavery can be defused in' similar fashion. The Qur'anic
provisions in that regard (which only served to humanize the existing
practice of slavery) can, of course, not be deleted. In fact, they
still help to protect people who, if not de jure, are de facto enslaved
and disenfranchised. Slavery is, after all, still suspected to be a
fact of life in remote areas of Mauritania. On the whole, the Qur'anic
provisions for slavery suggest, however, that Allah intended the
(gradual) abolition of slavery as a legal institution. Thus slaves had
to be given the opportunity to buy their freedom; releasing a slave was
declared a good deed, and frequently prescribed as an act of
penitence." It follows that a Muslim state without any reservation can
endorse international prohibitions of slavery.
Islam's pronounced protection of ethnic groups, religious minorities
and the status of women will be discussed in more detail in the
chapters "Similar or Identical?", "Colorblind", and "What are they here
for?". Relevant for the present discussion is the fact that religious
minorities in the Muslim world would feel today like second?class
citizens if they did not enjoy full citizenship but simply remained, as
in the past, "under protection" (dhimmi).
According to Fathi Osman and others, there is no legal obstacle to
granting non?Muslims full citizenship, if they so wish, as long as
Muslim countries organize themselves as nation?states, and not as
religious foundations.ls One innovation follows from the other. An
important aspect of the Shari'ah's minority statute is that it assures
a specific standard of protection without capping allowable rights. The
dhimmi status is the minimum, not the maximum, to be granted to
non?Muslim subjects.
The Muslim Brothers in Egypt, too, no longer dispute full civil rights
for the large Coptic minority. 16 As full citizens, as a matter of
course, nonMuslims lose their special privileges and are thus subject
to both general taxation and the military draft.
The next logical step is to question whether or not it is compatible
with international law if a Muslim state excludes a non?Muslim from
becoming head of state. Although logically compelling, this question is
without practical relevance. It is, after all, unlikely that a
non?Muslim could get elected state president in a truly Muslim country.
But if this were to happen, the country in question could no longer be
considered `Muslim' anyway, so that the election would have to be
honored on that ground.
The corporal punishments foreseen by the Shari'ah's penal provisions
(hudud) are deemed cruel and demeaning by Western human rights
standards, hence a violation of international law. On trial here, in
particular, are the stoning or flogging of adulterersl7 and amputations
for theft. 18
Westernized Muslims panic easily apologetically whenever this subject
comes up. Rather they should call attention to the fact that even the
self?appointed paragon of Western morality, the United States of
America, clings to the death penalty, executing hundreds of people
(mainly black) year after year, by hanging, lethal injection or the
electric chair. Execution is arguably the most gruesome of all corporal
punishments ? and demeaning to boot. As long as this is so, it appears
hypocritical to complain about Islam, especially since the Muslim
judicial practice differs widely from what is theoretically permitted
under Islamic law. This also pertains to capital punishment, which
Qur'anic law permits, but does not necessarily demand, as the most
severe punishment for murder, robbery, and high treason. 19
It should also be pointed out that the deterrent effect of penal law is
recognized in the West, as well, even though the prospect of punishment
seems not to make an impression on every single type of criminal.
Nowadays however, in the West, particularly in Europe, penal codes are
no longer implemented in such a way that they would deter. Even
convicted murderers are hardly doing more than a handful of years,
"languishing" in prisons of bed?and?breakfast quality. Even a major spy
can expect weekend passes for good behavior. Early release has gone
from being an act of mercy to being an entitlement. "Violence against
property", graciously sparing people, is being trivialized.
In contrast to all that, the deterrent effect of the Islamic penal code
definitely provides higher public safety, mainly for women, and also
reflects a higher regard for personal property. These positive effects
endure for a while. even in places where Qur'anic law is no longer
applied. Thus in Istanbul, a city of 15 million people, the streets are
still largely safe, even at night.
I am not alone in holding that there is no Islamic justification for
stoning. In fact, a provision for stoning married adulterers cannot be
found in the Qur'an, but only in the Bible, in the Fifth Book of Moses
(Deuteronomy 22: 20?22). This Biblical norm is not binding for Muslims
any more, since it is superseded by Surah an?Nur (24: 2) ? a typical
lex posterior generalis.
It was always questionable in terms of Hadith scholarship whether such
a far?reaching penalty stoning could be admissible in contradiction to
Surah an?Nur (24: 2), since the sunnah, according to Taha Jabir
al'Alwani's convincing arguments, cannot alter the Qur'an. The purpose
of the sunnah ? as legitimized by the Qur' an ? is to explain and
supplement the teachings of the Qur'an, not to supersede or cancel
them. The sunnah cannot derogate the Qur'an,20
In case of adultery, this conclusion is even more valid, because the
stoning of the guilty party had been justified in the past by what
amounts to weak traditional records. 21 It is not even clear whether
the stoning incident mentioned in Hadith literature and the Prophet's
reported acquiescence took place before or after the revelation of the
Qur'anic verse dealing with adultery.22 If the incident had taken place
before the respective revelation, the sunnah in question would have
been overruled by the Qur' an as a procedural matter.
In view of the fact that the Qur'an does not prescribe stoning for any
crime whatsoever, it is curious but legally irrelevant that the Second
Caliph `Umar spoke of a "verse of stoning". That stoning for adultery
is not envisaged by the Qur'an should at least be accepted on the basis
of Verse (4: 25). This verse reduces the penalty for adultery by "one
half' whenever slaves are the culprits."
At any rate, the standards of evidence in the Islamic law of criminal
procedure are so exacting that hardly anybody can be convicted of
adultery who is not out to provoke his or her conviction. Normally,
except in cases of pregnancy, adultery can only be proven through
voluntary confession. (ex?President Clinton would have fared far better
under the Islamic rules of evidence for adultery 21 than under the
American system.)
In order to understand the Qur' anic punishment for theft and its
deterrent effect in Surah al?Ma'ida (5: 38), one first has to grasp its
socio?economic function. It is important to know how much the social
security of women, especially their old?age insurance, in regions under
Islamic law depends on their ability to safeguard their life?time
savings of cash and bridal gifts of gold, silver and diamonds, they had
received and not having any of that stolen. Except for modern credit
card societies functioning with little cash on hand, theft has to be
considered as a severe attack against the social foundations of the
entire community.
In a humanitarian spirit, Islamic jurisprudence has, nevertheless, bent
over backwards in order to limit the prosecution of this criminal
offense to exceptional cases. In this endeavor it has succeeded so well
that presently, one can spend years in the Muslim world without ever
encountering someone who has lost a hand for theft. This has less to do
with a shortage of thieves, than with the liberal legal definition of
what constitutes the type of theft mentioned in the Qur'an.
Accordingly, theft presupposes the stealing of well?guarded assets of
more than petty value that are not public property. In times of
economic crisis the prosecution of thieves had already been suspended
under the Second Caliph `Umar. A society cannot punish thieves produced
by its own neglect! In addition, the Islamic statute of limitations for
theft is extremely short, running out within a few weeks. Consequently,
conviction for theft is rare in the Muslim world, and execution of the
harsh Qur'anic punishments for theft is even rarer.
Whenever critics of Islam find attractive regulations in the Qur'an
?such as the command of tolerance in Surah al?Baqara (2: 256) and Surah
al?Ma'ida (5: 48) ? they tend to dismiss these and other impressive
norms by arguing that they do not square with Muslim reality. However,
wherever they find a Qur'anic provision distasteful to them ? like the
punishment for theft ? they exclusively focus on these norms without
regard to everyday practice. Holding the normative treatment of theft
against Islam without simultaneously considering its humane
implementation in real life is a stark case of double standards.
This overview (and the discussion of the status of women in the
subsequent chapter "Similar or Identical?") leads to the conclusion
that Islamic law does not fully accord with the 1966 Human Rights Pacts
of the United Nations. In view of that, some Muslim countries ratified
them with the proviso that the Shari'ah remains unaffected. But surely,
as we have seen, the areas of conflict are so limited in scope that
people of good will can acknowledge Islamic law as a complementary
system of human rights.
As far as the areas of conflict are concerned, I have tried to
demonstrate that while all differences cannot be resolved, at least
they can be narrowed down thanks (i) to a reinterpretation (ijtihad) of
some source materials, fully in conformity with the principles
(maqasid) of the Qur'an and the sunnah, and thanks (ii) to strict
adherence to Islamic criminal procedure. But this approach has its
limits because ultimately, as divine law, the Shari'ah is not subject
to human yardsticks. That is how it is, regardless of whether
manipulation of that law would appear to serve public interest
(maslaha) or improve the image of Islam in the West.
What good would Islam do the West (and Muslims, too) if it were no
longer different?
Notes
1. Sinnar, "Reflections on the 50th Anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights", in: Commentary, no. 19, Petaling Jaya,
Selangor, Malaysia, December 1998, p. 1?5.
2. Hicks, p. 1
3. Mazrui, "Islam and the End of History", in The American Journal of
Islamic and Social Sciences, vol. 10, no. 4, Hemdon, VA, 1993, p. 534;
Mazrui, "Islamic and Western Values", in: Iqra, San Jose, CA, January
1998, p. 13?18.
4. Manzoor, The Muslim World Book Review, vol 15, no. 1, Markfield,
LE (UK), 1994, p. 9.
5. "Islam oder Menschenrechte", in Explizit, Vienna, December 1998,
p. 12?15.
6. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 28, 1995.
7. Manzoor, p. 8.
8. Berliner Zeitung, Magazin, June 28/29, 1997.
9. With the possible exception of the principle that contracts are
binding, pacta sunt servanda, cf. Friedrich Berber, Lehrbuch des
Vdlkerrechts, vol. 1, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1960), p. 165.
10. Printed in "Zeitschrift der WeiBen Vater" Gazette of the White
Fathers, CIBEDO, Frankfurt 1991, pp. 178.
11. See periodical Ma'ab, vol. 6, no. 18, `Amman 1995, p. 6.
12. Osman (The Children, 1996), p. 30; Lang (1995), p. 195?199;
al?Turabi (1992), p. 41.
13. al?Bukhari, no. 6764.
14. Cf. 2:177; 4: 36; 5: 89; 9: 60; 58: 3.
15. Supported by Osman (The Children, 1996 ), p. 20, 43; and (Human
Rights, 1996), p. 19.
16. Cf. "Biirgerrechte auch fur Kopten" [Civil Rights also for Copts],
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 19, 1997.
17. 24:2 prescribes 100 lashes.
18. Verse 5: 38.
19. Sahrour, p. 7.
20. al-'Alwani, Preface to Ahmad 'Ali al?Imam, Variant Readings of the
Qur'an, p. XIV
21. Abu Dawud, Sunan, Hadith No. 4405; al?Bukhari, no. 8805 and 8810;
Muslim no. 4191?4225; al?Nawawi, no. 220.
22. al?Bukhari, vol. 8, no. 804 and 830, and vol. 9, no. 281.
23. 4:25; Osman (1997), p. 914, rejects the stoning for adultery for
this and other reasons.
24. Verse 24:61.
------------ ------------------------ --------------------
Published in:
Religion on the Rise,
Islam in the Third Millenium
By Murad Hoffman
Amana Publications, USA
Why should we accept declarations of human rights drafted by the same
powers that colonized and pillaged our countries? --- Shirin Sinnari
Where there is smoke, there is fire, the saying goes. This folk wisdom
forces Muslims to prove a negative: they have to disprove three major
accusations leveled at them by the West, i.e., that (1) Islam has
prevented them from respecting human rights, (2) especially the basic
rights of women, and that (3) Muslims have yet to show that they, are
capable of democracy. In essence, these are questions of morality, not
theology, but sooner or later they become the focus of every
Islamic?Christian dialogue.
This is quite obvious as far as the West is concerned. However, a
productive discussion of these three topics is a prerequisite ?
conditio sine qua non ? for any normalization of relationship with
Islam. What happens in these three fields is of even greater importance
for the Muslim side since the global future of Islam itself may hinge
on it. On the other hand, as Neil Hicks sees it, it is also quite
evident that certain forces in the West have a vested interest in
perpetuating the myth of Islam's incompatibility with human rights and
democracy.2 It is never easy to prove a negative; however, this chapter
sets out to demonstrate that Muslims are indeed not incapable of
protecting human rights, for human rights are a distinctively an
integral, Islamic issue.
WHEN discussing human rights, Muslims often discover to their surprise
and dismay that their Western interlocutors believe to have both
invented and patented the subject. People in the Occident really expect
that human rights are respected only in the West, as a matter of
principle, and generally disrespected, again as a matter of principle,
all over the Muslim world.
The first conviction is quite understandable, because it was indeed the
Occident ? notably England ? where a specific human rights codex
emerged that was designed to protect the individual citizen from State
abuse, essentially as defensive freedom from something. Back then, in
the 17th and 18th centuries, it had not yet occurred to anybody to
demand from the monarchs the very civic entitlements which have become
so important today, the active freedom of something.
Important landmarks in the Western history of human rights were the
British Magna Charta Libertatum (1215), the Act of Habeas Corpus
(1679), the Bill of Rights (1689), the American Declaration of
Independence of 1776 (making reference to God), and the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 (less explicit
about God). The famous, but not binding, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948, was exclusively based on
these Western precedents. It was not much different from the two
(binding) International Pacts on Civic, Political, Social, Economic,
and Cultural Rights of December 19, 1966 and also from the human rights
instruments of the European Council.
And yet these developments became possible not due to Christianity, but
in spite of it. Up until Pope John XXIII in the past century, the
concept of human rights was condemned as secularist, laicistic, and
naturalist. Only with his Encyclical Pacem in Terris of April 11, 1963,
were human rights finally admitted into the Vatican.
This history does not imply that Islam did not possess any legal
concepts comparable to human rights, notably based on the Qur'an. The
Western pride of invention and ownership of human rights, is an
assertion which simply ignores the fact that, throughout history, the
states have always and everywhere disregarded the rights of ordinary
people, also in the Christian Occident. Even today, the state of human
rights is deplorable worldwide, also in ? but not limited to ? Muslim
countries; Amnesty International maintains depressing files.
Fairness requires non?Muslims to admit that violations of human rights
in nominally Islamic states, such as torture, police brutality,
election fraud, censorship, and infringements on religious freedom are
neither motivated by Islam nor legitimized by it. The fact that jails
in the Muslim world are primarily populated by Muslim activists of
strong religious convictions proves the contrary. One should accept
once and for all that a country like Turkey, with a Muslim population,
is not necessarily an Islamic state, just as a country like Spain,
populated by Christians, must not necessarily be called a Christian
state.
Western human rights experts cannot be spared answering the following
question repeatedly asked in this book: have there ever been worse
violations of human rights, in quantity as well as quality, than during
the two World Wars, with the use of chemical and nuclear weapons;
during the Stalinist terror regime and the Holocaust; under apartheid
in South Africa and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo? Muslims
committed none of these atrocities. The noted Kenyan social
anthropologist, professor, Ali Mazrui at Binghamton University, in the
State of New York says: "If Islam in the twentieth century has not
always been the most fertile ground for democracy, it has also been
less fertile ground for the greatest evils of this century: Nazism,
fascism, communism, and genocide .... Muslims are often criticized for
not producing the best, but they are not congratulated for having
standards of human behavior that avert the worst. There are no Muslim
equivalents of Nazi concentration camps, American racial lynching,
apartheid under the Dutch Reformed Church, Japanese racism before the
Second World War, or genocide under Stalin and Pol pot. '13
Even so, Western interlocutors still claim the moral high ground,
demanding the worldwide implementation of a Euro?American value system
of individual human rights under penalty of canceling their
developmental aid. Given the two widely differing yardsticks with which
Western people judge themselves and others, they should not be
surprised when young Muslims cynically observe that human rights
probably are "blond and blue?eyed."
Human rights, whether blond and blue?eyed or not, can be wielded like a
club. Therefore, Parvez Manzoor was correct when stating, in 1994, that
"Human Rights talk is power talk. 114 This is the reason why there are
still voices heard ? although they are fading out ? who talk about
Islam or human rights, as if they were opposites. They consider human
rights a "holy cow of modernity ... which should not be blindly
worshipped, but subjected to critical scrutiny ... especially since the
the Shari'ah offers solutions to every issue, independent of time and
place. "5
But no use complaining, Muslims have to take a stand. Most Muslims
states belong to the group of Third World countries euphemistically
called "developing countries", even those basking in a warm petrodollar
rain. These Third World countries, inclusive of Muslim ones,
traditionally defended their human rights record by pointing towards
the interdependence of civil rights on the one hand, and social,
economic and cultural rights on the other hand. They convincingly
argued that elections amount to little more than the confirmation of
tribal chiefs as long as voters remain illiterate. It may not fit into
the political pigeonhole of Third World ideologues but, according to
Panajotis Kondylis, it is self?evident that "human rights, which
promise each individual autonomy and dignity equally, can only thrive
in societies where a highly differentiated division of labor atomizes
the collective, and where mass production and consumption are running
in high gear. "6 It is equally undeniable that democracy needs a civil
society which, in turn, is . only possible when structural poverty is
overcome.
By using such arguments, Third World countries have managed to slip in
a catalog of their own particular human rights, such as the right to
education, work and livelihood, into some of the more recent human
rights treaties.
The same countries think they can ward off the human rights by
questioning their universal validity. (This is their second line of
defense.) In effect, they characterized the existing human rights
statutes as Euroand ethnocentric, and therefore as alien to other
cultures, such as those of Asia or Sub?Saharan Africa. Behind the
theory of universality they even detected Francis Fukuyama's flawed
assumption that history had come to an end by endorsing the Western
model of civilization, once and for all.7
This view of human rights may be correct as far as inflamatory and
stylish legal innovations are concerned, such as the "right to be
afraid" (of all things nuclear), the "right to intoxication" (by means
of legalized drugs), or the "right to homosexual marriage." The
assumption of a cultural limitation of human rights is, however, not
correct in respect to the classical core rights, such the right to
life, and freedom from torture, freedom of opinion, conscience,
_expression and religion, and the personal liberties (freedom of
movement, assembly, association, etc.).
Muslims damage their own cause whenever they get carried away towards
questioning any of these core human rights. In particular, they should
not exploit for their own purposes Samuel Huntington's pessimistic
assessment that worldwide unanimity on human rights exists in but one
point: the total reprehensibility of torture.'
A far better strategy would be to deal with the human rights phenomenon
in the framework of Islamic jurisprudence, i.e., on the basis of the
Qur'an and the sunnah. Of course, the term "human rights" was not
developed by Judaism, Christianity, or Islam. Indeed, if this modern
term were found in any holy scripture, it would be a glaring
anachronism betraying forgery. The absence of the term "human rights"
in religious discourse is due as well to the following: the very idea
that a created being could be possessor of rights evidently goes
against the grain of people ? Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike ? for
whom God, the Creator, is the sole source of rights. Divine rights for
individuals: yes. Rights of the individual: no. It was, after all, only
logical that the formulation of the concept of "human rights" had to
await a historical period, i.e., the 18th century Enlightenment, during
which man was proclaimed to be the autonomous measure of all things.
For people with transcendental links this was, and continues to be, a
downright blasphemous piece of irreligious fiction.
Muslim jurists have been particularly handicapped: given that the
entire Shari'ah is divine law, attempts to give particular norms, such
as human rights, higher rank or greater importance cannot be justified.
Muslim jurisprudence, to this day, has therefore resisted a
prioritization of norms. Muslims consistently refuse to establish a
normative hierarchy by distinguishing, according to human fancy,
between divine rights of a higher and lower order. Non?religious legal
systems like Roman Law, Civil and Common Law, French and German law,
deal with such a normative hierarchy, starting at the top with (a)
international law, and cascading down via (b) constitutional law, (c)
statutory law, to (d) decrees (d) government regulations, and (e)
administrative directives. Muslim jurists cannot, and do not, follow
suit. They continue to accord equal rank to all the norms set by the
Shari'ah, from the rules for ritual ablution to the prohibition of
earning interest. Thus there is no conceptual room for a particular set
of superior "human rights".
Although the term "human rights" is thus both absent and theologically
flawed, a positive Islamic approach to the human rights phenomenon
would yet have been possible. The fact that this opportunity was missed
opened Islam up to the nasty suspicion that it was hostile to human
rights and failing to take the protection of individuals from despotism
seriously enough. In fact, just a little ingenuity would have gone a
long way towards showing that Islam, from the very beginning 1400 years
ago, has not only known but substantially protected the core human
rights, and that Islam has anchored these rights more solidly in its
divine prime sources, the Qur'an and the sunnah, than the Occident
could with any number of man?made treaties.
The evidence is right there: take the statutory prohibition of murder
in Surah an?Nisa (4: 92) and Allah's equating the murderer of a single
person with someone killing the entire human race in Surah al?Ma'ida
(5: 32). While not specifically spelling it out, both passages
indirectly ?as a legal reflex ? permit one to discover in the Qur' an a
God?given right to life, enjoyed by all human beings. Take Surah
ash?Shura (42: 38) with Allah's commands the Muslims to settle their
affairs through mutual consultation. This obligation, phrased as a
duty, can be taken indirectly as implying the right to political
participation. The fact that the first three caliphs were elected into
office without being blood?relatives of Muhammad is sufficient evidence
to prove that an Islamic state could be a republic and need not be a
monarchy. Along these lines it can be shown that the protection of
individuals against abuse is an original Islamic concern. Should it not
then, also be possible to reinterpret the offensive terminology of
human rights as being consistent with the Qur'anic rights of man?
It should be evident that rights laid down by God are more securely
rooted than rights merely granted by treaties and hence subject to
negotiations and social change. In the West ? whether in the former
Soviet Union or in the United States ? the beautiful catalogues and
bills of human rights oftentimes were hardly worth their paper in
actual practice. Do not ask the Klu?Klux?Klan, ask African?Americans
and North American Indians.
It cannot be denied that mankind never succeeded in finding a
universally acceptable system of "natural rights", either from
observing nature or by sheer force of reasoning.9 This may be one of
the reasons why former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt (Hamburg) and
former professor of Catholic theology Hans Kung (Tiibingen) are working
towards a United Nations declaration on human obligations. Obviously,
human rights are insufficiently secured without correspondding duties
and need further buttressing by more and more paper! When will people
realize that human rights cannot stand the test of time unless solidly
founded on divine revelation?
In the wake of the above mentioned, somewhat self?righteous Occidental
human rights offensive, the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC), the most important Muslim intergovernmental organization,
finally got its act together. On August 5, 1990, as regional
sub?organization of the United Nations, it issued the "Cairo
Declaration of Human Rights in Islam", a document not legally binding,
but of political significance only." Of even lesser legal weight had
been the proceeding "Declaration of Human Rights" issued on September
19, 1981, by an "Islamic Council of Europe", a rather obscure outfit of
dubious legitimacy.
Important Islamic personalities and scholars have also entered the
human rights debate, among them individuals as influential as Muhammad
Hamidullah, Abul 'Ala Mawdudi and Prince Hassan of Jordan. During a
round table conference for the purpose of "Promoting the Universality
of Human Rights", which he had convened in `Amman from December 10 ?
13, 1994, Prince Hassan said, "Regarding human rights, we absolutely
need a global consensus ( . . . . ). The Universal Declaration on Human
Rights circumscribes the minimum standards of human life. I believe
that my faith, Islam, pursues the same goal. Each of the 30 articles of
the Declaration corresponds to a passage in Qur'an, Hadith, and sunnah
of the Prophet." The first conclusion drawn at the conference was:
"Human rights dwell in all human beings.""
THE foregoing observations will make it easier to delineate those few
differences which appear to distinguish the catalog of Islamic human
rights from the Western ones. At issue are (a) apostasy, (b) slavery,
(c) law of asylum, (d) the status of women, and (e) corporal
punishment. If current efforts (ijtihad) towards a better understanding
of the relevant Islamic sources, wholeheartedly supported by me, are
successful, the positions of both sides will become far closer than
they now appear to be. Required was, and is, a contemporary exegesis of
Islamic sources by major scholars like Muhammad Asad (1900?1992),
Rashid alGhannoushi, Hassan and Mather Hathout, Alija Izetbegovich,
Jeffrey Lang, Fathi Osman, Yusuf al?Qaradawi, Fazlur Rahman
(1919?1988), Mohamed Talbi and Hassan al?Turabi.
Concerning apostasy, any conflict with international law disappears
once the Muslim side recognizes that neither the Qur'an nor the sunnah
specify any punishment in this world (fl?d?dunya) for merely breaking
with Islam.12 The Qur'an describes no less than 13 cases of apostasy;
invariably severe consequences are announced, but only for the
afterlife. Earlier, the universally valid maxim "no compulsion in
matters of religion!" (la ikraha fi?d?din; 2:256) had been interpreted
as applying only to the relationship between Muslims and non?Muslims.
In this day and age, however, all Muslims should admit that this
fundamental rule of religious tolerance must form the relationship
among Muslims as well. Should they not be at least as tolerant among
each other as they are bound to be toward outsiders? Those who deny the
universal application of the Qur'an verse 2: 256, among them many an
overzealous Muslim, forget that "no compulsion in matters of religion!"
also restates that, given the crucial importance of intention (niya),
coercion in matters of personal conviction means attempting the
impossible. Muslim states can enforce proper behavior except when its
validity requires personal assent. Pummeling the faithful into praying
and fasting should become a thing of the past.
Originally, apostate ex?Muslims were only prosecuted, and rightly so,
if in addition they also committed high treason (ar?ridda), i.e., if
they actively fought against the Muslim community in the sense of Surah
alMa'ida (5): 33. High treason includes hurting the cause of Islam by
withholding legitimate taxes, espionage, sabotage, counter?propaganda,
and any other way of "causing mischief on earth".
It remains true, however, that apostates under an Islamic community are
discriminated against in matters of inheritance, because according to
the sunnah, Muslims and non?Muslims cannot inherit from each other.l3
Here, being a member of the Islamic community is equated to modern
citizenship, and international civil law, as a matter of principle,
sees nothing wrong in tying inheritance to citizenship.
The problem of slavery can be defused in' similar fashion. The Qur'anic
provisions in that regard (which only served to humanize the existing
practice of slavery) can, of course, not be deleted. In fact, they
still help to protect people who, if not de jure, are de facto enslaved
and disenfranchised. Slavery is, after all, still suspected to be a
fact of life in remote areas of Mauritania. On the whole, the Qur'anic
provisions for slavery suggest, however, that Allah intended the
(gradual) abolition of slavery as a legal institution. Thus slaves had
to be given the opportunity to buy their freedom; releasing a slave was
declared a good deed, and frequently prescribed as an act of
penitence." It follows that a Muslim state without any reservation can
endorse international prohibitions of slavery.
Islam's pronounced protection of ethnic groups, religious minorities
and the status of women will be discussed in more detail in the
chapters "Similar or Identical?", "Colorblind", and "What are they here
for?". Relevant for the present discussion is the fact that religious
minorities in the Muslim world would feel today like second?class
citizens if they did not enjoy full citizenship but simply remained, as
in the past, "under protection" (dhimmi).
According to Fathi Osman and others, there is no legal obstacle to
granting non?Muslims full citizenship, if they so wish, as long as
Muslim countries organize themselves as nation?states, and not as
religious foundations.ls One innovation follows from the other. An
important aspect of the Shari'ah's minority statute is that it assures
a specific standard of protection without capping allowable rights. The
dhimmi status is the minimum, not the maximum, to be granted to
non?Muslim subjects.
The Muslim Brothers in Egypt, too, no longer dispute full civil rights
for the large Coptic minority. 16 As full citizens, as a matter of
course, nonMuslims lose their special privileges and are thus subject
to both general taxation and the military draft.
The next logical step is to question whether or not it is compatible
with international law if a Muslim state excludes a non?Muslim from
becoming head of state. Although logically compelling, this question is
without practical relevance. It is, after all, unlikely that a
non?Muslim could get elected state president in a truly Muslim country.
But if this were to happen, the country in question could no longer be
considered `Muslim' anyway, so that the election would have to be
honored on that ground.
The corporal punishments foreseen by the Shari'ah's penal provisions
(hudud) are deemed cruel and demeaning by Western human rights
standards, hence a violation of international law. On trial here, in
particular, are the stoning or flogging of adulterersl7 and amputations
for theft. 18
Westernized Muslims panic easily apologetically whenever this subject
comes up. Rather they should call attention to the fact that even the
self?appointed paragon of Western morality, the United States of
America, clings to the death penalty, executing hundreds of people
(mainly black) year after year, by hanging, lethal injection or the
electric chair. Execution is arguably the most gruesome of all corporal
punishments ? and demeaning to boot. As long as this is so, it appears
hypocritical to complain about Islam, especially since the Muslim
judicial practice differs widely from what is theoretically permitted
under Islamic law. This also pertains to capital punishment, which
Qur'anic law permits, but does not necessarily demand, as the most
severe punishment for murder, robbery, and high treason. 19
It should also be pointed out that the deterrent effect of penal law is
recognized in the West, as well, even though the prospect of punishment
seems not to make an impression on every single type of criminal.
Nowadays however, in the West, particularly in Europe, penal codes are
no longer implemented in such a way that they would deter. Even
convicted murderers are hardly doing more than a handful of years,
"languishing" in prisons of bed?and?breakfast quality. Even a major spy
can expect weekend passes for good behavior. Early release has gone
from being an act of mercy to being an entitlement. "Violence against
property", graciously sparing people, is being trivialized.
In contrast to all that, the deterrent effect of the Islamic penal code
definitely provides higher public safety, mainly for women, and also
reflects a higher regard for personal property. These positive effects
endure for a while. even in places where Qur'anic law is no longer
applied. Thus in Istanbul, a city of 15 million people, the streets are
still largely safe, even at night.
I am not alone in holding that there is no Islamic justification for
stoning. In fact, a provision for stoning married adulterers cannot be
found in the Qur'an, but only in the Bible, in the Fifth Book of Moses
(Deuteronomy 22: 20?22). This Biblical norm is not binding for Muslims
any more, since it is superseded by Surah an?Nur (24: 2) ? a typical
lex posterior generalis.
It was always questionable in terms of Hadith scholarship whether such
a far?reaching penalty stoning could be admissible in contradiction to
Surah an?Nur (24: 2), since the sunnah, according to Taha Jabir
al'Alwani's convincing arguments, cannot alter the Qur'an. The purpose
of the sunnah ? as legitimized by the Qur' an ? is to explain and
supplement the teachings of the Qur'an, not to supersede or cancel
them. The sunnah cannot derogate the Qur'an,20
In case of adultery, this conclusion is even more valid, because the
stoning of the guilty party had been justified in the past by what
amounts to weak traditional records. 21 It is not even clear whether
the stoning incident mentioned in Hadith literature and the Prophet's
reported acquiescence took place before or after the revelation of the
Qur'anic verse dealing with adultery.22 If the incident had taken place
before the respective revelation, the sunnah in question would have
been overruled by the Qur' an as a procedural matter.
In view of the fact that the Qur'an does not prescribe stoning for any
crime whatsoever, it is curious but legally irrelevant that the Second
Caliph `Umar spoke of a "verse of stoning". That stoning for adultery
is not envisaged by the Qur'an should at least be accepted on the basis
of Verse (4: 25). This verse reduces the penalty for adultery by "one
half' whenever slaves are the culprits."
At any rate, the standards of evidence in the Islamic law of criminal
procedure are so exacting that hardly anybody can be convicted of
adultery who is not out to provoke his or her conviction. Normally,
except in cases of pregnancy, adultery can only be proven through
voluntary confession. (ex?President Clinton would have fared far better
under the Islamic rules of evidence for adultery 21 than under the
American system.)
In order to understand the Qur' anic punishment for theft and its
deterrent effect in Surah al?Ma'ida (5: 38), one first has to grasp its
socio?economic function. It is important to know how much the social
security of women, especially their old?age insurance, in regions under
Islamic law depends on their ability to safeguard their life?time
savings of cash and bridal gifts of gold, silver and diamonds, they had
received and not having any of that stolen. Except for modern credit
card societies functioning with little cash on hand, theft has to be
considered as a severe attack against the social foundations of the
entire community.
In a humanitarian spirit, Islamic jurisprudence has, nevertheless, bent
over backwards in order to limit the prosecution of this criminal
offense to exceptional cases. In this endeavor it has succeeded so well
that presently, one can spend years in the Muslim world without ever
encountering someone who has lost a hand for theft. This has less to do
with a shortage of thieves, than with the liberal legal definition of
what constitutes the type of theft mentioned in the Qur'an.
Accordingly, theft presupposes the stealing of well?guarded assets of
more than petty value that are not public property. In times of
economic crisis the prosecution of thieves had already been suspended
under the Second Caliph `Umar. A society cannot punish thieves produced
by its own neglect! In addition, the Islamic statute of limitations for
theft is extremely short, running out within a few weeks. Consequently,
conviction for theft is rare in the Muslim world, and execution of the
harsh Qur'anic punishments for theft is even rarer.
Whenever critics of Islam find attractive regulations in the Qur'an
?such as the command of tolerance in Surah al?Baqara (2: 256) and Surah
al?Ma'ida (5: 48) ? they tend to dismiss these and other impressive
norms by arguing that they do not square with Muslim reality. However,
wherever they find a Qur'anic provision distasteful to them ? like the
punishment for theft ? they exclusively focus on these norms without
regard to everyday practice. Holding the normative treatment of theft
against Islam without simultaneously considering its humane
implementation in real life is a stark case of double standards.
This overview (and the discussion of the status of women in the
subsequent chapter "Similar or Identical?") leads to the conclusion
that Islamic law does not fully accord with the 1966 Human Rights Pacts
of the United Nations. In view of that, some Muslim countries ratified
them with the proviso that the Shari'ah remains unaffected. But surely,
as we have seen, the areas of conflict are so limited in scope that
people of good will can acknowledge Islamic law as a complementary
system of human rights.
As far as the areas of conflict are concerned, I have tried to
demonstrate that while all differences cannot be resolved, at least
they can be narrowed down thanks (i) to a reinterpretation (ijtihad) of
some source materials, fully in conformity with the principles
(maqasid) of the Qur'an and the sunnah, and thanks (ii) to strict
adherence to Islamic criminal procedure. But this approach has its
limits because ultimately, as divine law, the Shari'ah is not subject
to human yardsticks. That is how it is, regardless of whether
manipulation of that law would appear to serve public interest
(maslaha) or improve the image of Islam in the West.
What good would Islam do the West (and Muslims, too) if it were no
longer different?
Notes
1. Sinnar, "Reflections on the 50th Anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights", in: Commentary, no. 19, Petaling Jaya,
Selangor, Malaysia, December 1998, p. 1?5.
2. Hicks, p. 1
3. Mazrui, "Islam and the End of History", in The American Journal of
Islamic and Social Sciences, vol. 10, no. 4, Hemdon, VA, 1993, p. 534;
Mazrui, "Islamic and Western Values", in: Iqra, San Jose, CA, January
1998, p. 13?18.
4. Manzoor, The Muslim World Book Review, vol 15, no. 1, Markfield,
LE (UK), 1994, p. 9.
5. "Islam oder Menschenrechte", in Explizit, Vienna, December 1998,
p. 12?15.
6. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 28, 1995.
7. Manzoor, p. 8.
8. Berliner Zeitung, Magazin, June 28/29, 1997.
9. With the possible exception of the principle that contracts are
binding, pacta sunt servanda, cf. Friedrich Berber, Lehrbuch des
Vdlkerrechts, vol. 1, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1960), p. 165.
10. Printed in "Zeitschrift der WeiBen Vater" Gazette of the White
Fathers, CIBEDO, Frankfurt 1991, pp. 178.
11. See periodical Ma'ab, vol. 6, no. 18, `Amman 1995, p. 6.
12. Osman (The Children, 1996), p. 30; Lang (1995), p. 195?199;
al?Turabi (1992), p. 41.
13. al?Bukhari, no. 6764.
14. Cf. 2:177; 4: 36; 5: 89; 9: 60; 58: 3.
15. Supported by Osman (The Children, 1996 ), p. 20, 43; and (Human
Rights, 1996), p. 19.
16. Cf. "Biirgerrechte auch fur Kopten" [Civil Rights also for Copts],
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 19, 1997.
17. 24:2 prescribes 100 lashes.
18. Verse 5: 38.
19. Sahrour, p. 7.
20. al-'Alwani, Preface to Ahmad 'Ali al?Imam, Variant Readings of the
Qur'an, p. XIV
21. Abu Dawud, Sunan, Hadith No. 4405; al?Bukhari, no. 8805 and 8810;
Muslim no. 4191?4225; al?Nawawi, no. 220.
22. al?Bukhari, vol. 8, no. 804 and 830, and vol. 9, no. 281.
23. 4:25; Osman (1997), p. 914, rejects the stoning for adultery for
this and other reasons.
24. Verse 24:61.
------------ ------------------------ --------------------
Published in:
Religion on the Rise,
Islam in the Third Millenium
By Murad Hoffman
Amana Publications, USA
posted by ডঃ নুরুল ইসলাম মনজুর | 11:59 PM
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